Ethnic and cultural tensions in the post-Soviet space largely have their roots in the territorial delineations established during the early Soviet period (1920s–1930s), particularly through the policy of so-called national-territorial delimitation (in Russian: национально-территориальное размежевание, transliteration: natsionalno-territorialnoye razmezhevaniye). Although this policy officially aimed to create coherent national republics based on ethnic, linguistic, and economic criteria,[1][2] it often resulted in complex borders that left many minorities isolated within entities dominated by other groups. These decisions, compounded by later policies of centralization and russification contributed to the emergence of interethnic tensions following the breakup of the USSR.[3][4]
Throughout most of the Soviet era, such tensions remained latent, largely due to the authoritarian nature of the regime, which suppressed any form of identity-based or political expression. However, starting in 1985, the implementation of perestroika and glasnost reforms by Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a certain degree of freedom of expression, allowing national demands to surface in several republics and autonomous regions.[5] It was in this new climate that the regional Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh (a majority-Armenian region) formally requested to be transferred to the Armenian SSR—an event that triggered the first post-Soviet conflict: the First Nagorno-Karabakh War.
After the fall of the USSR, 25 million Russians found themselves outside the borders of the newly formed Russian Federation.[6] Despite this event which could have triggered the emergence of irredentist sentiment, the Russian political class showed almost no will of this type. This can be explained by the context of the time. Russia in the 1990s and early 2000s was grappling with significant internal problems, including economic crisis (linked to the transition to a market economy), constitutional crisis, internal war (Chechnya), dysfunctional public services, and more... These issues effectively relegated foreign policy to the sidelines.[7]
At the same time, several former Warsaw Pact countries joined NATO, viewing the alliance as a source of security and a path towards deeper integration with the West.[8] Russian leaders consistently condemned this expansion, perceiving it as a direct threat to Russia. In 1994, president Boris Yeltsin declared, "Our attitude towards NATO expansion plans [...] remains and will remain invariably negative. [...] This decision can lead to a deterioration of trust between Russia and Western countries."[9]
Despite these denunciations, the Russian government took little to no concrete actions to counter these waves of NATO expansion. On the contrary, cooperation was even established with the signing of a NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997. This apparent contradiction between rhetoric and action can once again be attributed to the broader Russian context of the time: Russia had lost its superpower status and, as mentioned earlier, was in a concerning internal situation. To avoid completely losing its influence on the international stage, Russian leaders sought to fully integrate into the world order, which at the time was reflected in the desire to establish good relations with the United States, the hyperpower [es] of the era, hence the wish for positive relations with NATO.[10][11]
Vladimir Putin's rise to power in 2000 marked a turning point in Russian domestic and foreign policy. Although he initially maintained the same approach as his predecessor regarding relations with the West, the stated goal was to restore the Russian state, weakened by the previous decade, and to strengthen its authority on the international stage. During his early terms, Putin primarily sought to economically revitalize the country, benefiting from the rise in hydrocarbons prices. Foreign policy remained relatively moderate, despite persistent tensions regarding NATO expansion and Western influence in the post-Soviet space. However, a major turning point occurred in 2007 with Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference. He openly denounced the unilateralism of the United States, criticized NATO expansion as a provocation, and reaffirmed Russia's intention to defend its strategic interests.[12][13] This speech is widely interpreted as the end of the cooperation phase and the beginning of a more aggressive foreign policy.
The first concrete manifestation of this new orientation occurred in 2008 with the Russo-Georgian War. For several years, Georgia, under the presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili, had expressed its desire to join Euro-Atlantic structures, even formally applying for NATO membership in April 2008.[14] This rapprochement was viewed negatively by Moscow, which saw the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance as a direct threat to its strategic interests in the Caucasus. On August 7, 2008, the situation deteriorated when Georgian authorities attempted to retake South Ossetia by force,[15][16] a separatist region supported by Russia since the 1990s. In response, Moscow took advantage of the situation and intervened militarily under the pretext of defending the Ossetian and Russian populations of the region.[17] After eight days of fighting, Georgia was forced to sign a ceasefire. Russia then recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two secessionist regions, and established permanent military bases there.[18] This conflict marked a decisive step: for the first time since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia explicitly used force to pressure a neighboring state to deter it from integrating into Western structures, thus asserting its role as a regional power and initiating a more pronounced shift towards irredentist policies.
The 2008 Russo-Georgian War constituted an important precedent, demonstrating that Russia was now prepared to use force to defend its post-Soviet sphere of influence. However, this intervention remained limited in its immediate territorial objectives, with Moscow content to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia without proceeding to formal annexation. The true conflict demonstrating Russia's irredentist and expansionist will was the Ukrainian conflict, which began in 2014 and intensified in 2022.
Column of Russian tanks entering Ukraine (March 2022)
In February 2014, the pro-European Maidan movement led to the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych,[19] which Moscow perceived as a Western-backed coup.[20] In March, Russia annexed Crimea, a peninsula strategically important due to its majority Russian population and the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. This action was widely condemned by the international community.[21] Simultaneously, pro-Russian separatist insurgencies erupted in eastern Ukraine, notably in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, indirectly supported by Moscow.[22] This dual movement—the annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Donbass—marked a break with the more moderate policy of post-Soviet Russia, indicating a clear irredentist will.[23] The conflict then stabilized into a low-intensity war, punctuated by the Minsk agreements (2014 and 2015), without a real settlement. While Ukraine strengthened its ties with the European Union and NATO, Russia pursued a hybrid influence policy and consolidated its hold on Crimea. In February 2022, citing the protection of Russian-speaking populations, Moscow launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine.[24] This invasion marked a major turning point in post-Soviet history: for the first time, Russia undertook a full-scale conventional war against a sovereign former Soviet state, implicitly claiming irredentist objectives and openly challenging the international order established after the end of the Cold War.
Recognition of these states varies. Transnistria has not received recognition from any UN member state, including Russia. Abkhazia and South Ossetia have received recognition from Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Syria. The Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics had received recognition from Russia, Syria, and North Korea before their unrecognized annexation by Russia.
Began when ethnic groups from the Gharm and Gorno-Badakhshan regions of Tajikistan, which were underrepresented in the ruling elite, rose up against the national government of PresidentRahmon Nabiyev, in which people from the Leninabad and Kulob regions dominated. The war ended with the signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan and the Moscow Protocol.[34]
Also known as the People's April Revolution, the Melon Revolution or the April Events. Began with the ousting of KyrgyzpresidentKurmanbek Bakiyev in the capital Bishkek. The violence ultimately led to the consolidation of a new parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan.[37]
Protests across Kazakhstan that were sparked by an abrupt increase of gas prices, but have escalated into general protests. Kazakhstan's government has requested CSTO assistance in quelling the protests.
Over proposed amendments by PresidentShavkat Mirziyoyev to the Constitution of Uzbekistan which would have ended Karakalpakstan's status as an autonomous region of Uzbekistan and right to secede from Uzbekistan via referendum. A day after protests had begun in the Karakalpak capital of Nukus, President Mirziyoyev withdrew the constitutional amendments. The Karakalpak government said that protesters had attempted to storm government buildings.[63]
A civil war between the post-coup Georgian government of Eduard Shevardnadze and supporters of ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia results in Gamsakhurdia's defeat with Russian military support for Shevardnadze.
An incursion by Al-Qaeda forces into Georgia on behalf of Chechen rebels fighting in the North Caucasus. They were forced out in 2004 by Georgian forces with American and Russian backing.
A war between Georgia on one side and Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other side confirms the de facto independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and leads to their recognition by Russia and Nicaragua.[125]
Armenian and Azerbaijani forces fight a four-day long conflict along the border of the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh. Azerbaijani forces make minor territorial gains, some of which are retaken by Armenian forces before the end of the conflict.
Armenian and Azerbaijani forces engage in border clashes along the Tavush Province of Armenia and Tovuz District of Azerbaijan. The death of Azerbaijani major general Polad Hashimov sparks the July 2020 Azerbaijani protests. Turkey and Azerbaijan organize large-scale military exercises following the clashes, and tensions persist until the beginning of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War 2 months later.
Azerbaijan retakes most of the territories previously controlled by the Republic of Artsakh. Russian peacekeepers introduced into the remaining disputed area.
Azerbaijan launches an attack on the Republic of Artsakh after nine months of blockade. The Artsakh Defence Army disbands, the government of the Republic of Artsakh agrees to dissolve itself entirely by January 1, 2024, and almost the entire population of Artsakh flees to Armenia.
The Transnistria War started due to fear from Transnistria's population to a potential unification of Moldova with Romania. Heavy fighting started on 1 March 1992 and culminated on 21 July, and a ceasefire has been in place since 1992; Russian forces are illegally stationed in Moldova ever since.
Euromaidan is the name given to civil unrest that started when the Ukrainian government cancelled an association agreement with the EU in favour of closer ties with Russia. The protests escalated and led to the Revolution of Dignity, which toppled the Ukrainian government.
In February 2014, Russia invaded Crimea. In March, following the takeover of Crimea by pro-Russian separatists and Russian Armed Forces,[194] a referendum (not recognised by the new Ukrainian authorities)[195] was held on the issue of reunification with Russia.[196] This took place in the aftermath of the Revolution of Dignity.[197] Russia then annexed Crimea on 18 March.
As a result of the revolution in Kyiv, a pro-Russian unrest in the eastern regions of the country escalated into mass protests and violence between the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian activists. In Crimea, the events served as a pretext for a Russian annexation of the region. In Donbas, the situation quickly escalated into a war. Protests in other regions included seizure of government buildings in Kharkiv and deadly clashes in Odesa.
As a result of the unrest, a full-fledged war began in the Ukrainian Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, known collectively as Donbas. The separatist "people's republics" captured a strip of land on the border with Russia. Major combat ended with the signing of the second Minsk agreements in early 2015, with a stalemate lasting until the start of the full-scale invasion by Russia of February 2022.
^Soviet authorities generally sided with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.[90] Soviet troops were present in Nagorno-Karabakh for 2+1⁄2 years and supported Azerbaijani militias.[91] Soviet troops directly intervened during Operation Ring in April–May 1991 on the Azerbaijani side.[92][93]
^Ceasefire agreement was signed on 1 December 1993,[117] although fighting continued during 1994.
^The International Crisis Behaviour Project at Duke University defines the crisis as having lasted from 27 July 2002, the date of an attack by Chechen separatists on Russian forces at Itum-Kale in Russia, to 7 October 2002, when Russia and Georgia agreed to joint patrols on their mutual border.[124] This period also included Russian airstrikes on Georgian territory, Georgia's most consequential security operation in the Gorge, and the final exit of Ruslan Gelayev. There had been an armed separatist presence in the Gorge since 1999, and Russia's forceful objections begun, at the latest, in November 2002. Russia's first coercive measures against Georgia took place the next month.
^Transnistria is a separatist and internationally unrecognized de facto state, regarded as Moldovan territory by all United Nations members.
^War escalated as Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, however the term "war in Donbas" is not generally used for events occurring after the invasion started.
^ abThe Donetsk People's Republic and the Luhansk People's Republic were Russian puppet states, having declared their independence from Ukraine in May 2014. Several months into the invasion, Russia declared that it had formally annexed both entities in September 2022. They continue to exist as republics of Russia.
^South Ossetia's status is disputed. It considers itself to be an independent state, but this is recognised by only a few other countries. The Georgian government and most of the world's other states consider South Ossetia de jure a part of Georgia's territory.
^The political status of Abkhazia is disputed. Having unilaterally declared independence from Georgia in 1992, Abkhazia is formally recognised as an independent state by 5 UN member states (two other states previously recognised it but then withdrew their recognition), while the remainder of the international community recognizes it as de jure Georgian territory. Georgia continues to claim the area as its own territory, designating it as Russian-occupied territory.
^Supporters of Alexander Rutskoy, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies frequently used those flags. The Russian tricolor itself only remained hoisted at the White House building (see video documentaryArchived July 23, 2011, at the Wayback Machine).
^There are "some contradictions and inherent problems" regarding the date on which the Russian operation began.[185] The Ukrainian Government maintains, and the European Court of Human Rights agrees, that Russia controlled Crimea from 27 February 2014,[186] when unmarked Russian special forces took control of its political institutions.[187] The Russian Government later made 27 February "Special Operations Forces Day".[188] In 2015, the Ukrainian parliament officially designated 20 February 2014 as "the beginning of the temporary occupation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia",[189] citing the date inscribed on the Russian medal "For the Return of Crimea".[190] In 2018, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that the earlier "start date" on the medal was due to a "technical misunderstanding".[191] President Putin stated in a film about the annexation that he ordered the operation to "restore" Crimea to Russia following an all-night emergency meeting on 22–23 February 2014.[185][192][193]
^Reports of some protesters attending under duress from superiors[159]
^The Kazakh government claimed that the CSTO's operations were solely for peacekeeping purposes.
^Martin, Terry (2001). The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Cornell University Press. ISBN0801486777.
^Haugen, Arne (2003). The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN1403915717.
^OSCE Summit, Budapest, December 5, 1994, Boris Yeltsin's speech
^Chatard, Antoine (2020-10-08). "La Russie dans l'OTAN ?". Le Grand Continent (in French). Retrieved 2025-05-07.
^Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated in 1993: “The most important thing is partnership with the United States. Moreover, we must be the main partner [of the United States]; otherwise, nothing will remain of our great power status
^Abdulfattoh, Shafiev (February 2016). "Iran and Tajikistan: A Story of Love and Hate"(PDF). Central Asia Policy Brief. 34. At the end of 1992, Tajikistan entered into a bloody civil war. Tehran gave refuge and support to the leaders of the Democratic-Islamic coalition of the Tajik opposition, and was therefore considered to be a pro-Islamic actor. However, it also contributed a critical role in helping peace discussions: Tehran hosted several rounds of the Tajik peace negotiations in 1994, 1995, and 1997, bringing both sides to the discussion table. President Rahmon paid an official visit to Tehran in 1995 and opened an embassy there. But seen from Dushanbe, Moscow was a more reliable ally than Tehran, and any kind of pan-Persian nationalism was rapidly shut down by the authorities.
^ abCooley, John K. (2002). Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (3rd ed.). London: Pluto Press. p. 195. ISBN978-0-7453-1917-9. A Turkish Fascist youth group, the "Grey Wolves," was recruited to fight with the Chechens.
^"Islamic State spokesman calls on other factions to 'repent,' urges sectarian war". The Long War Journal. 23 June 2015. Archived from the original on 24 June 2015. Retrieved 24 June 2015. Baghdadi, the "Emir of the Faithful," has "accepted your bayat and has appointed the noble sheikh Abu Muhammad al Qadarī as Wali [or governor] over [the Caucasus]," Adnani says.
^Panossian 2002, p. 145 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPanossian2002 (help): "Until the dissolution of the USSR, the Soviet authorities sided, in general, with Azerbaijan. ... Soviet troops sent to the conflict area ... on numerous occasions, took the side of the Azerbaijani forces to 'punish' the Armenians for raising the NK issue."
^Cornell 1999, p. 26: "Sporadic clashes became frequent by the first months of 1991, with an ever-increasing organization of paramilitary forces on the Armenian side, whereas Azerbaijan still relied on the support of Moscow. ... In response to this development, a joint Soviet and Azerbaijani military and police operation directed from Moscow was initiated in these areas during the Spring and Summer of 1991.". sfn error: no target: CITEREFCornell1999 (help)
^Papazian 2008, p. 25: "units of the 4th army stationed in Azerbaijan and Azeri OMONs were used in 'Operation Ring', to empty a number of Armenian villages in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 1991.". sfn error: no target: CITEREFPapazian2008 (help)
^Taarnby 2008, p. 6. sfn error: no target: CITEREFTaarnby2008 (help)
^Brzezinski & Sullivan 1997, p. 616: "It is also revealed that a new force of 200 armed members of the Grey Wolves organization has been dispatched from Turkey in preparation for a new Azeri offensive and to train units of the Azeri army." sfn error: no target: CITEREFBrzezinskiSullivan1997 (help)
^Demoyan 2006, p. 226: "Turkey continued to provide military as well as economic aid to Azerbaijan. As further proof, the Turkish army and intelligence services launched undercover operations to supply Azerbaijan with arms and military personnel. According to Turkish sources, over 350 high-ranking officers and thousands of volunteers from Turkey participated in the warfare on the Azerbaijani side.". sfn error: no target: CITEREFDemoyan2006 (help)
^Kramer, Andrew E. (29 January 2021). "Armenia and Azerbaijan: What Sparked War and Will Peace Prevail?". The New York Times. Retrieved 4 March 2021. Armenia has said that Turkey was directly involved in the fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, and that a Turkish F-16 fighter shot down an Armenian jet. Turkey denied those accusations.
^Tsvetkova, Maria; Auyezov, Olzhas (9 November 2020). "Analysis: Russia and Turkey keep powder dry in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". Reuters. Retrieved 4 March 2021. Turkey's support for Azerbaijan has been vital, and Azerbaijan's superior weaponry and battlefield advances have reduced its incentive to reach a lasting peace deal. Ankara denies its troops are involved in fighting but Aliyev has acknowledged some Turkish F-16 fighter jets remained in Azerbaijan after a military drill this summer, and there are reports of Russian and Turkish drones being used by both sides.
^Ed Butler (10 December 2020). "The Syrian mercenaries used as 'cannon fodder' in Nagorno-Karabakh". BBC. Retrieved 23 July 2024. Although Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey deny the use of mercenaries, researchers have amassed a considerable amount of photographic evidence, drawn from videos and photographs the fighters have posted online, which tells a different story.
^Cookman, Liz (5 October 2020). "Syrians Make Up Turkey's Proxy Army in Nagorno-Karabakh". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 23 July 2024. According to sources within the Syrian National Army (SNA), the umbrella term for a group of opposition militias backed by Turkey, around 1,500 Syrians have so far been deployed to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in the southern Caucasus ... Shortly after conflict erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey sought to mobilize the SNA, sometimes called Turkey's proxy army ... The first fighters were transferred in late September to southern Turkey and then flown from Gaziantep to Ankara, before being transferred to Azerbaijan on Sept. 25.
^De La Pedraja, René (2018). The Russian Military Resurgence: Post-Soviet Decline and Rebuilding, 1992–2018. McFarland. pp. 93–94. ISBN9781476634494. This response was too much for the commander of the 14th Army General Yuri Netkachev, who ordered Russian troops to drive out the Moldovan forces. The 14th Army had always supported the separatists since the very beginning, but this direct support was the first open participation in combat. ... The participation of the 14th Army was indispensable for the victory of the separatists, ... Moldovan forces were concentrated in a forest near Bender, and Lebed decided to stop their advance by relying on his powerful artillery. At 0300 on 3 July massive barrages rained down on the unsuspecting Moldovans ...
^"Russia's New Foreign Policy"(PDF). American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. p. 5. Retrieved 10 February 2023. Hence their wholehearted support for Yeltsin in his September–October 1993 confrontation with the Left-nationalist radical supporters of the Supreme Soviet. The Czech President Václav Havel said October 4 that the clashes in Moscow were not simply 'a power struggle, but rather a fight between democracy and totalitarianism.' In a joint statement Presidents Lennart Meri of Estonia, Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia, and Algirdas Brazauskas of Lithuania called the struggle in Moscow 'a contest between a democratically elected President and antidemocratic power structures.' Their Moldovan counterpart, Mircea Snegur, called the Supreme Soviet supporters 'Communist, imperialist forces who want to turn Russia into a concentration camp'. 'In my thoughts I am on the barricades with the defenders of Russian democracy, as I was next to them in August 1991,' Eduard Shevardnadze said in a message to the Kremlin on the late afternoon of October 3, 1993, when the outcome looked quite grim for Yeltsin. 'Deeply concerned about the events in Moscow, I am again expressing my resolute support for President Yeltsin and his allies.'
^"'Russian Revolution of October 1993' seen from office of Moldova's ambassador in Moscow. Op-Ed by Anatol Țăranu, ex-ambassador of Moldova to Russia". IPN press agency. 2023-09-28. Retrieved 2024-01-22. Unlike Chisinau, the leaders of the Transnistrian separatists supported almost openly the Rutskoy-Khasbulatov camp, sending paramilitaries from Transnistria to the Russian capital to defend the White House. On October 4, the Moldovan ambassador in Moscow gave an interview for the Russian press, in which he warned about the presence of representatives of paramilitary detachments of the Transnistrian separatists among the defenders of the White House.
^Ivakhnenko, Vladimir (6 December 2013). Майдан готовит Януковичу вече [Square prepare Yanukovych Veche]. Svoboda (in Russian). Archived from the original on 8 December 2013. Retrieved 8 December 2013.
^"Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (decision)". European Court of Human Rights. January 2021. The Ukrainian Government maintains that the Russian Federation has from 27 February 2014 exercised effective control over the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol ... There was sufficient evidence that during the relevant period the respondent State [Russia] had exercised effective control over Crimea.
^Sasse, Gwendolyn (2023). Russia's War Against Ukraine. Wiley & Sons. p. 2004. Russia's war against Ukraine began with the annexation of Crimea on 27 February 2014. On that day, Russian special forces without any uniform insignia appeared in Crimea, quickly taking control of strategic, military and political institutions.
^DeBenedictis, Kent (2022). Russian 'Hybrid Warfare' and the Annexation of Crimea. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 140. During the night of 26–27 February, Russian special forces without insignia departed Sevastopol ... They arrived at the Crimean Rada and Council of Ministers buildings in Simferopol, disarmed the security and took control of the buildings ... Putin later signed a decree designating 27 February as Special Operations Forces Day in Russia.
^"7683rd meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Thursday, 28 April 2016, 3 p.m. New York". Mr. Prystaiko (Ukraine): I have to remind the Council that the official medal that was produced by the Russian Federation for the so-called return of Crimea has the dates on it, starting with 20 February, which is the day before that agreement was brought to the attention of the Security Council by the representative of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the Russian Federation started – not just planned, but started – the annexation of Crimea the day before we reached the first agreement and while President Yanukovych was still in power.
^Simon Shuster (10 March 2014). "Putin's Man in Crimea Is Ukraine's Worst Nightmare". Time. Retrieved 8 March 2015. Before dawn on Feb. 27, at least two dozen heavily armed men stormed the Crimean parliament building and the nearby headquarters of the regional government, bringing with them a cache of assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades. A few hours later, Aksyonov walked into the parliament and, after a brief round of talks with the gunmen, began to gather a quorum of the chamber's lawmakers.