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China Central Television Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Central_Television

China Central Television
TypeState media
Country
China
First air date
1 May 1958
HeadquartersCCTV Headquarters, Beijing, People's Republic of China
Broadcast area
Worldwide
Owner Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party[1]
ParentChina China Media Group
(Government of the People's Republic of China)
Former names
Beijing Television
25
19
CallsignsVoice of China (external)
Affiliation(s)China Global Television Network
Official website
cctv.com
China Central Television
Simplified Chinese中国中央电视台
Traditional Chinese中國中央電視台
Literal meaningChina Central Television Station
Chinese abbreviation
Simplified Chinese央视
Traditional Chinese央視
Literal meaningCentral-Vision
The old China Central Television Building.
Politics of China
National Emblem of the People's Republic of China (2).svg
Leadership
Leadership generations
Succession of power
National leaders
Orders of precedence
Related systems
Communist Party
History
Constitution
Organization
United Front
Historical parties:
Ideology
Legislative
Presidency
Executive
Military
Military history
Supervision
Propaganda
Cross-Strait relations
Foreign relations
Related topics
flag China portal

China Central Television (CCTV) is a Chinese state-owned broadcaster controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). CCTV has a network of 50 channels broadcasting different programmes and is accessible to more than one billion viewers in six different languages.[2] Most of its programmes are a mixture of news, documentary, social education, comedy, entertainment, and drama, the majority of which consists of Chinese soap operas and entertainment.[3] However, news reporting about topics which are sensitive to the CCP is distorted and often used as a weapon against the party's perceived enemies, according to Freedom House and other media commentators.[4][5] CCTV is operated by the National Radio and Television Administration which reports directly to the Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party.[6][7]

CCTV was established on 1 May 1958 to be a state-owned propaganda machine. CCTV has a variety of functions, such as news communication, social education, culture, and entertainment information services. As a state television station it is responsible to both the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council.[8] It is a central player in the Chinese government's propaganda network.[4][1]

History[edit]

In 1954, CCP chairman Mao Zedong put forward that China should establish its own TV station. On 5 February 1955, the central broadcasting bureau reported to the State Council and proposed the program of establishing a medium-sized television station, later on premier Zhou Enlai included in China's first five-year plan the planned introduction of television broadcasts. In December 1957, the central broadcasting bureau sent Luo Donghe and Meng Qiyu to the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic for the inspection of their TV stations, then the duo returned to Beijing to prepare for the establishment of the promised TV station.[citation needed]

At 19:00 on 1 May 1958; Beijing Television (the predecessor of China Central Television) began its test transmissions, and for the first time, the Chinese Communist Party's own TV signals were broadcast in Beijing. On the screens of the few dozen television receivers in Beijing that night, a picture of the headquarters building with the words "Beijing TV station" written on it appeared. On 2 September of that year, BTV broadcast officially for the first time. Later the number of official TV programs increased from twice a week to four times a week (on Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday and Sunday).[citation needed]

From 1 January 1960; BTV changed the fixed program schedule and started to broadcast eight times a week and added one program on Sunday morning. BTV also set up a dozen fixed TV shows in order to cater to the vast audiences, the shows include news columns and entertainment shows. The media function of TV had extended further. In May of the same year, the construction of the "new building" in the courtyard of the headquarters was completed. Due to increasing demands, it soon launched its second channel in 1963 and third channel in 1969, followed by the first simultaneous satellite broadcasts nationwide in 1972.[citation needed]

Starting from 1 May 1973, Beijing Television began broadcasting experimentally in color on its second channel every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday using the PAL-D system, and fully converted to color broadcasting by 1977. On 1 January 1978; its flagship news broadcasts were officially launched. On 1 May of the same year, with the approval of the CCP Central Committee, BTV, which celebrated its 20th anniversary was officially renamed CCTV (China Central Television, 中央电视台) and a new logomark debuted.[9] In 1979, the iconic butterfly logo made its debut, which would be used as the corporate identity of the CCTV network for the next two decades.[citation needed]

Until the late 1970s, CCTV held only evening broadcasts, usually closing down at midnight. During the summer and winter academic vacations, it occasionally transmitted daytime programming for students, while special daytime programs were aired during national holidays. In 1980 CCTV experimented with news relays from local and central television studios via microwave.[10] By 1985, CCTV had already become a leading television network in China. In 1987 CCTV's popularity soared due to the adaptation and presentation of Dream of the Red Chamber. The 36-episode TV series—the first Chinese television drama to enter the global market—[11] still remains popular in the international market. In the same year, CCTV exported 10,216 programmes to 77 foreign television stations.[11]

Initially, the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party issued directive censorship of programs. During reform in the 1990s, the Party adopted new standards for CCTV, "affordability" and "acceptability", loosening the previous government control.[12] Affordability refers to purchasing ability of programs, while acceptability requires that a program has acceptable content, preventing the broadcast of material that contains inappropriate content or expresses views against the Chinese Communist Party.[13]

In July 2009 CCTV expanded its coverage and target audience by launching CCTV-العربية, its international channel in Arabic language.[14]

On 17 June 2013, CCTV announced that most of the broadcast facilities for the CCTV network have been relocated to the current headquarters building.[15]

In 2015 and 2018, CCTV signed cooperation agreements with Russian state media outlet RT.[16][17][18]

On 31 December 2016, China Central Television's foreign language services were spun off into China Global Television Network (CGTN).[citation needed]

In March 2018, as the nation began marking the 60th year of television, CCTV ownership changed hands to a new state holding group, the China Media Group, as the television arm of the newly launched multimedia broadcasting conglomerate operated by both the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council.[7]

2009 fire[edit]

Main article: Beijing Television Cultural Center fire

On 9 February 2009, the Beijing Television Cultural Center caught fire on the last day of the festivities of Chinese New Year, killing one firefighter.[19] The blaze rendered the 42-story structure unusable, as the zinc and titanium alloy of the outer skin was burnt.[19] The Mandarin Oriental Hotel was destroyed before its expected 2009 opening.[19]

The fire had implications for the credibility of CCTV, which was already unpopular because of its dominance in the media.[20] The incident was mocked by netizens who reproduced photoshopped photos of the fire and criticised CCTV for censoring coverage. Pictures of the fire are widely distributed on the internet, as a result of citizen journalism.[21]

Libyan Civil War[edit]

During the 2011 military intervention in Libya, reports from CCTV tended to support Muammar Gaddafi's arguments, claiming that the coalition forces attacked Libyan civilians and the military intervention was no different from an invasion. In some of the news reports, CCTV used images of demonstrators and said that they were against NATO's military intervention. CCTV also mislabeled a person holding a banner which said "Vive la France" ("long live France" in French) and claimed that he was a supporter of Gaddafi. Later on 27 March, a Chinese banner that said "Muammar Gaddafi is a lier. [sic]" was shown in some Libyan demonstration videos on the Internet.[22]

2019 NBA free speech dispute[edit]

In 2019, CCTV announced that they were cancelling the broadcast of two National Basketball Association preseason games in response to a tweet by the General Manager of the Houston Rockets, Daryl Morey, in support of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. After Adam Silver defended the General Manager's right to free speech, CCTV responded with, "We express our strong dissatisfaction and opposition to Silver's stated support of Morey's right to free speech. We believe any remarks that challenge national sovereignty and social stability do not belong to the category of free speech," and continued, "We will also immediately examine all other cooperation and exchanges with the NBA."[23]

Censorship and disinformation about the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine[edit]

Further information: Disinformation in the 2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis

During the 2022 Winter Paralympics, CCTV censored a speech by International Paralympic Committee president Andrew Parsons condemning the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[24][25] CCTV promoted Russian disinformation such as unsubstantiated claims of biological weapons labs in Ukraine.[26][27][28][29] In April 2022, CCTV repeated Russian claims that the Bucha massacre was staged.[30]

Organization[edit]

China Central Television, as a component of the CMG, falls under the supervision of the National Radio and Television Administration which is in turn subordinate to the State Council of the People's Republic of China. A Vice Minister of the state council serves as chairman of CCTV. The organisation has relationships with regional television stations run by local governments, which must reserve up to two channels for the national broadcaster.[31]

The organization is considered one of the "big three" media outlets in China, along with the People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency.[32]

Management[edit]

The current president of CCTV is Shen Haixiong, who was appointed in February 2018.[33]

Programs[edit]

CCTV produces its own news broadcasts three times a day and is the country's most powerful and prolific television program producer. Its thirty-minute evening news, Xinwen Lianbo ("CCTV Network News" or "CCTV Tonight", Chinese: 新闻联播), goes on air daily at 7:00 pm Beijing time. All local stations are required to carry CCTV's news broadcast. An internal CCTV survey indicates that nearly 500 million people countrywide regularly watch this program.[34] However, the figure has slumped in recent years; the program now has 10% of the ratings market, compared to 40% before 1998.[35]

Focus, first introduced in 1994, is a popular programme on CCTV. This discussion programme regularly exposes the wrongdoings of local officials, which attracts serious attention from higher levels of government. The programme also exposes the Chinese Government's response to the charges of corruption.[36]

The CCTV New Year's Gala (Chinese: 中国中央电视台春节联欢晚会)—a yearly special program for the Chinese New Year—is the most-watched CCTV programme.[37]

In 2003 CCTV launched its first 24-hour news channel, initially available to cable viewers.[38]

Personalities[edit]

Producing a variety of different programming, China Central Television has a number of different program hosts, news anchors, correspondents, and contributors who appear throughout daily programing on the network.[39]

Channels[edit]

Main article: CCTV channels

The CCTV channels are listed in sequential order with no discerning descriptions, e.g. CCTV-1, CCTV-2, etc., similar to those channels in Europe and in other places around the world.

Public Channels[edit]

All CCTV channels are independently broadcast. The following 16 channels are public channels, it means that the channels are free; they only need to pay the ratings for the maintenance to the local cable without having to pay for subscription fees. The following is list of the channels with their names:

CGTN Channels[edit]

Pay channels[edit]

Currently, CCTV owns the following 13 pay television channels, these pay channels started using HDTV signals as of 1 Jan 2020, and their SDTV signals were shut down since 29 June 2020, 04:00 (BJS):

  • TV Guide (de facto free in many local DTV operators)
  • Storm Theater
  • The First Theater
  • Nostalgia Theater
  • Storm Music
  • Women's Fashion
  • Storm Football
  • Golf & Tennis
  • Billiards
  • World Geography
  • Culture of Quality
  • Hygiene and Healthy
  • Weapon and Technology

Contracted pay channels[edit]

These pay channels are contracted out to the Central News Documentary Film Studio on 24 July 2020:

  • Discovery (now CNDF Outlook)
  • Old Stories (now CNDF Old Stories)
  • Students (now CNDF Middle Students)
Discontinued pay channels[edit]
  • Securities Information - shutted down since January 2021
  • Shinco Animation (contracted out to CNDF, renamed as CNDF Shinco Animation on 24 July 2020) - shutted down on 30 January 2022

Overseas channels[edit]

All CCTV channels are also broadcast via the following:

All CCTV channels are broadcast 24 hours a day except the following channels, the broadcast time of each channels:

  • CCTV-7 National Defense and Military (SDTV): 06:00-00:00 (the next day)
  • CCTV-10 Science and Education (SDTV): 05:55-02:25 (the next day)
  • CCTV-11 Chinese Opera (SDTV): 06:00-02:30 (the next day)
  • CCTV-12 Society and Law (SDTV): 05:55-02:45 (the next day)
  • CCTV-14 Children (SDTV): 5:55-3:05 (the next day)
  • CCTV-15 Music (Pop music programs broadcast on CCTV-3, SDTV): 05:57-01:50 (the next day)
  • CCTV-17 Agricultural and Rural (SDTV): 06:00-00:00 (the next day)
  • CCTV-3DTV Test: 10:30-00:00 (the next day)(closed)
  • CCTV-4K: 06:00-00:00 (the next day)

Every day at 5:55 CST the March of the Volunteers (National Anthem of China) plays on most channels (except for International Channels and Pay Channels).[citation needed]

Overseas broadcasting[edit]

Further information: China Global Television Network

In 2001, the Great Foreign Propaganda Plan was launched by Xu Guangchun, the head of SARFT, also the deputy head of the Publicity Department of the Chinese Communist Party after the urgency of bringing the voice of China to the world was presented by Jiang Zemin, former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.[citation needed] The idea of an English channel was brought out in 1996. CCTV-4 had three half-hour English news broadcasting every day, but later, on 25 September 2000, CCTV-9 a satellite channel was set up to be the first 24-hour English channel, aimed to establish the overseas market. In October 2001, CCTV partnered with AOL Time Warner and other foreign news corporations, giving them access to the Chinese media market in exchange for cable delivery in the US and Europe, mainly delivering CCTV-9 programs.[41]

The CCTV-4 channel split into three separate channels on 1 April 2007—each serving different time zones: China Standard Time (CST), Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), and Eastern Standard Time (EST)—in order to improve service for audiences around the world.[31]

On 25 July 2009, CCTV launched its Arabic-language international channel, stating that it aims to maintain stronger links with Arabic nations.[42] "Dialogue, China Story, Documentary, and Science & Technology Review" is a program that air on CCTV-A six time a day.[41] The Arabic Channel serves the Middle East, North Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region.[43][44]

Lassina Zerbo interviewed by China Central Television

China Network Television[edit]

Main article: China Network Television

China Network Television (CNTV) was an internet-based broadcaster of China Central Television which launched on 28 December 2009 with a budget of US$75 billion for that year.[citation needed]

Audience share[edit]

In 2007, China's television audience rose to 1.2 billion.[45] The 2008 Summer Olympics coverage on CCTV resulted in an aggregate 41% audience share across its network.[46] As content becomes more diversified, there have been concerns about the audience share, as CCTV is losing out to cable, satellite and regional networks.[47] In Guangzhou for example, CCTV programming only accounts for 45% of the weekly audience share,[48] while in Shanghai, local stations also have share over CCTV.[49] However, the CCTV New Year's Gala remains extremely popular; it acquires more than 90% audience share over the nation.[38]

Reception[edit]

The network's principal directors and other officers are appointed by the State, and so are the top officials at local conventional television stations in mainland China; nearly all of them are restricted to broadcasting within their own province or municipality. Editorial independence is subject to government policy considerations, and as a result, it has been charged with being "propaganda aimed at brainwashing the audience" in its history and news programmes in a letter written by a number of Chinese intellectuals who also called for a boycott of state media was posted on a US-based website and has circulated through Chinese websites.[50][51] The network often publishes misleading and false information, particularly as it pertains to issues considered sensitive by the Chinese government. However, only a small percentage of the Network's programming can be described as "abusive or demonizing propaganda."[52]

Journalists working for the network's English-language international channel, CGTN, as well as of the other non-Chinese language TV channels under the CGTN banner, are under constant pressure to present a positive account of China, according to Anne-Marie Brady's study published in 2008. "In August 2005, a series of items reported factually on the coal mining disaster in China; soon after the channel's leaders received a warning from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that its reports were harming China's international image. Following this incident, senior editorial staff and journalists were all forced to write self-criticisms."[3]

Brady says that while the channel's equipment is state-of-the-art, the employees are not well trained in how to use it, so there are frequent errors during a broadcast. "The political controls on the station contribute to a generally low level of morale and initiative among station staff," she writes.[3]

A study done by the observer of Chinese film and television, Ying Zhu, suggests that "CCTV is full of serious-minded creators who regularly experience bouts of self-doubt, philosophical ambivalence, and in some cases, clinical depression." During her extensive interviews with key CCTV players, Zhu notes that "Certain common themes, about ideals, distorted or altogether thwarted by commercial and political pressure, emerged."[53][54]

According to Freedom House CCTV "has a consistent record of blatantly and egregiously violating journalistic standards and encouraging or justifying hatred and violence against innocent people. CCTV is an essential component of the CCP's brutal authoritarian regime and should be treated as such."[4]

In 2020, the United States Department of State designated CCTV as a foreign mission, which requires it to disclose more about its operations in the U.S.[55][56]

Controversies[edit]

Since its inception CCTV has served as a tool of state power and as such has been complicit in human rights abuses. They have a history of demonizing and inciting hatred against those perceived as foes by the CCP, in this way they can be used to mobilize against threats as diverse as Falun Gong and international Human Rights Groups.[4]

1990s Falun Gong crackdown[edit]

One of the earliest recorded uses of the Network for both domestic and international propaganda purposes occurred in 1999 during the first crackdown on the Falun Gong new religious movement. During one 32 day period in 1999 Focus Talk ran 28 episodes which defamed practitioners and incited hatred against them.[52] In 2001 they deceptively claimed that a group of people who had set themselves on fire in Tiananmen Square were Falun Gong adherents, a claim which was characterized as "clearly abusive" by the Canadian regulatory commission.[4]

Xinwen Lianbo and internet purity[edit]

On 27 December 2007, Xinwen Lianbo aired a report about the wide and easy availability of explicit content on the internet. The report appealed to juristic institutions and government to hurry to make relevant legislation in order to purify the internet environment. In the report, a young student described a pop-up advertisement she saw as being "very erotic very violent".[57] After the airing of the report, many parodies were posted by internet users ridiculing the comment and CCTV's credibility in part.[58] The incident also questioned the reliability of Xinwen Lianbo, noting the unlikelihood of a web page being both violent and erotic at the same time (even though such pages do exist), and the age of the student interviewed. Personal information of the interviewed girl was later also leaked, identifying the girl in the report by name.[59] Online message boards were populated by large threads about the incident,[60] and a satirical work even stated that CCTV's website was the number one "very erotic very violent" website on the internet,[61] with some users even creating their own toplists of sites which meet these criteria,[62] the "top 8 very erotic very violent sports events"[63] and even identifying things that are yellow as being erotic (since 黄, huáng, the Chinese character for "yellow", also means "erotic").[64]

Xinwen Lianbo and fake imagery[edit]

On 23 January 2011, Xinwen Lianbo showcased the Chengdu J-10 firing a missile at a plane, causing it to explode. The footage lasted half a second and the destroyed plane shown was later identified as that of an F-5E, a US fighter jet. The clip was later revealed to have been taken from the 1986 US movie Top Gun.[65][66]

Comments by CCTV head Hu Zhanfan[edit]

In 2011, the new CCTV head Hu Zhanfan "was found to have proclaimed in July [or January,[67] both before the CCTV appointment in November] that journalists' foremost responsibility is to 'be a good mouthpiece'"[68] (当好喉舌工具). Internet posts of the comment blossomed after the appointment, one "juxtapos[ing] CCTV's ... Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播) and photos of Chinese crowds waving red flags with black-and-white images from Nazi-era Germany". Comparisons with the Nazi propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels (gepei'er (戈培尔)) also spread. Official media coverage of the Zhanfan's presentation focused on his call to avoid "fake news and false reports (失实报道)" but also incorporated the "mouthpiece" comment.[67]

Da Vinci Furniture[edit]

In mid-2011 on CCTV, reporter Li Wenxue asserted that Da Vinci Furniture of Shanghai was falsely labeling Chinese-made furniture as imported from Italy. At the end of the year, "Shanghai's industry and commerce bureau fined Da Vinci more than $200,000 last week for what it called substandard furniture",[69] though in August, "the Shanghai Administration of Industry and Commerce ... cleared Da Vinci of any wrongdoing on its Italian product labeling". Also, Da Vinci produced a tape and bank records to back its assertion that it had paid 1 million yuan ($150,000), via a public relations broker, to Li to stop any further negative reports by CCTV.[70] Li said the claim is "slander" and CCTV made no comment. Zhang Zhi'an, an associate journalism professor at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou said, "I think CCTV has too much power", contrasting the Da Vinci case with extortion attempts by journalists at smaller media outlets. Liam Bussell, Asia-Pacific strategic marketing manager for Mintel in Shanghai, said in part, "Da Vinci's definitely done something". Also, "[g]iven the corruption in Chinese media and the volume of counterfeit products in the country, Bussell sa[id] it's often hard to find someone in these disputes who's totally clean".[69]

Broadcasting forced confessions[edit]

CCTV regularly broadcasts the forced confessions of accused or convicted criminals and produces programming to go along with them.[71] These programs are often filmed before the beginning of formal judicial procedures.[72] Domestic dissidents such as lawyers, journalists, and activists as well as foreigners have been the victim of this practice.[73][74][75]

In 2013 Peter Humphrey and Charles Xue's forced confessions were aired on CCTV.[72] Since being freed, Humphrey has been highly critical of CCTV and the practice of airing forced confessions.[76] In 2020, the British media regulator Ofcom sided with Humphrey and announced sanctions against CGTN, which aired Humphrey's confession and was branded as CCTV News at the time.[77][78]

In 2014, CCTV broadcast the forced confession of the then-septuagenarian journalist Gao Yu.[73]

In 2016, Peter Dahlin and Gui Minhai's forced confessions were aired on CCTV.[72] In 2019 Dahlin filed a complaint against China Global Television Network (CGTN) and China Central Television-4 (CCTV-4) with Canadian authorities.[79]

On 21 November 2019, CCTV's international arm CGTN aired a video of a forced confession from Hong Kong activist Simon Cheng. Within a week, Cheng had filed a new complaint to Ofcom over the broadcast.[80]

In 2020, the forced confession of Taiwanese citizen Lee Meng-chu was aired on a CCTV program. A day later, the same program aired the forced confession of an academic from Taiwan accused of espionage and separatist activities.[81]

See also[edit]

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